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Abstract:  
Wireless Sensor Networks  have come to the forefront of the scientific community  recently. Present WSNs 
typically communicate directly with a centralized controller or satellite. Going on the other hand, a smart WSN 
consists of a number of sensors spread across a geographical area; each sensor has wireless communication 
ability and sufficient intelligence for signal processing and networking of the data.   This paper surveyed the 
different  types  of  attacks,  security  related  issues,  and  it’s  Countermeasures  with  the  complete  comparison 
between Layer based Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless  Sensor  Networks  have  recently 
emerged as a premier research area. They have great 
long term economic potential, capability to transform 
our  lives,  and  create  many  new  system-building 
challenges. Sensor networks also create a number of 
new  abstract  and  optimization  problems,  some  of 
these such as location, exploitation and tracking, are 
primary  issues,  in  that  many  applications  rely  on 
them for required information. Coverage in general, 
answers  the  questions  about  quality  of  service  that 
can be provided by a particular sensor network. The 
combination  of  multiple  types  of  sensors  such  as 
seismic,  optical,  acoustic,  etc.  in  one  network 
platform and the study of the overall coverage of the 
system also presents several interesting challenges.  
 
WSN  is  formed  by  the  collection  of  sensor 
nodes, each equipped with its own sensor, processor, 
radio  transceiver  and  small  memory  with  limited 
battery power. These nodes are capable of performing 
some  processing,  gathering,  sensing  and 
communication. Security is a general concern for any 
network  system,  but  security  in  WSN  is  of  great 
importance to ensure its application success [1]. From 
the security standpoint, it is very essential to provide 
secure  localization,  data  authentication,  data 
freshness,  data  confidentiality,  data  integrity,  data 
availability and time synchronization [2]. Hence the 
QOS (quality of service) constraints such as memory, 
computational  power,  battery  power,  transmission 
range  should  be  minimized  so  that  the  overhead 
caused by the security protocols can be light weighted 
[3].  
 
All  these  security  challenges  are  encouraging 
researchers to develop security protocols and  
 
 
algorithms suitable for WSN. A few of the security 
mechanisms are key management and cryptography, 
secure  time  synchronization,  secure  location 
discovery, secure routing, trust management system, 
secure data aggregation and intrusion detection. 
 
Sensor networks have different constraints than 
traditional wired networks. Initial, the nodes in sensor 
networks are probable to be battery powered, and it is 
frequently very difficult to change the batteries for all 
of  the  nodes,  as  energy  conserving  forms  of 
communication  and  computation  are  essential  to 
wireless sensor networks. Second, since sensors have 
limited computing power, they may not be capable to 
run sophisticated network protocols. Third the nodes 
deployed may be either in a controlled environment 
where monitoring, maintenance and surveillance are 
very  difficult.  Finally  in  the  uncontrolled 
environments, security for sensor networks becomes 
extremely difficult. 
 
 In this paper  we  talk about the  most common 
security Attacks and it’s Countermeasures in wireless 
sensor  networks  and  try  to  give  an  evaluation  of 
various existing security approaches. 
 
II.  Security Requirements in WSNs 
A  WSN  is  a  special  type  of  network,  Shares 
some  commonalities  with  a  typical  computer 
network, but also exhibits many characteristics which 
are  unique  to  it.  The  security  services  in  a  WSN 
should  protect  the  information  communicated  over 
the  network  and  the  resources  from  attacks  and 
misbehavior  of  nodes.  The  most  essential  security 
requirements in WSN are listed below: 
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Data confidentiality: The security mechanism should 
ensure that no message in the network is understood 
by anyone except intended recipient. In a WSN, the 
issue of confidentiality should address the following 
requirements [4, 5]: (i) Key distribution mechanism 
should be extremely robust, (ii) A sensor node should 
not allow its readings to be accessed by its neighbors 
unless  they  are  authorized  to  do  so,  (iii)  Public 
information such as sensor identity and public keys of 
the nodes should also be encrypted in certain cases to 
protect against traffic analysis attacks.  
 
Data integrity: The mechanism should guarantee that 
no  message  can  be  changed  by  an  entity  as  it 
traverses from the sender to the recipient. 
 
Availability:  This  requirements  ensures  that  the 
services of a WSN should be available always even in 
presence of an internal or external attacks such as a 
Denial of Service attack (DoS). Different approaches 
have  been  proposed  by  researchers  to  achieve  this 
goal. While a few mechanisms make use of additional 
communication among nodes, others advise use of a 
central  access  control  system  to  ensure  successful 
delivery of every message to its recipient. 
 
Data freshness: It implies that the data is recent and 
ensures  that  no  adversary  can  replay  previous 
messages.  This  requirement  is  especially  important 
when the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)  nodes use 
shared-keys  for  message  communication,  where  a 
potential  adversary  can  begin  a  replay  attack  using 
the previous key as the new key is being refreshed 
and  propagated  to  all  the  nodes  in  the  Wireless 
Sensor  Network  (WSN).  A  nonce  or  time-specific 
counter  may  be  added  to  each  packet  to  check  the 
freshness of the packet. 
 
Self-organization:  Each  node  in  a  WSN  should  be 
self  organizing  and  self-healing.  This  feature  of  a 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) also poses a great 
challenge  to  security.  The  dynamic  nature  of  a 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) makes it sometimes 
impossible  to  deploy  any  preinstalled  shared  key 
mechanism among the nodes and the base station [6]. 
A number of key pre-distribution schemes have been 
proposed in the context of symmetric encryption [7, 
6,  8].  However,  for  application  of  public-key 
cryptographic techniques an efficient mechanism for 
key distribution is very much essential. It is desirable 
that the nodes in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
self-organize among themselves not only  for multi-
hop routing but also to carryout key management and 
developing trust relations. 
 
Secure localization: In many situations, it becomes 
necessary to accurately and automatically locate each 
sensor node in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). 
For  example,  a  Wireless  Sensor  Network  (WSN)  
designed  to  locate  faults  would  require  accurate 
locations  of  sensor  nodes  identifying    faults.  A 
potential adversary can easily provide and manipulate 
false  location  information  by  reporting  false  signal 
strength,  replaying  messages.  If  the  location 
information is not secured properly. The authors in 
[9]  have  described  a  technique  called  verifiable 
multilateration (VM). In multilateration, the position 
of a device is accurately computed from a series of 
recognized  reference  points.  The  authors  used 
authenticated  ranging  and  distance  bounding  to 
ensure accurate location of node. Because the use of 
distance  bounding,  an  attacking  node  can  only 
enlarge  its  claimed  distance  from  a  recognized 
reference  point.  However,  to  ensure  position 
consistency,  the  attacker  would  also  have  to  prove 
that  its  distance  from  another  reference  point  is 
shorter. As it is not possible for attacker to verify this, 
it  is  possible  to  detect  the  attacker.  In  [10],  the 
authors  have  described  a  scheme  called  Secure 
Range-independent  Localization.  The  scheme  is  a 
decentralized  range  independent  localization 
schemes. It is assumed that the locators are trusted 
and cannot be compromised by any attacker. A sensor 
computes  its  position  by  listening  to  the  beacon 
information sent by each locator which includes the 
locator’s position information. The beacon messages 
are encrypted using a shared global symmetric key 
that  is  predistributed  in  the  sensor  nodes.  Using 
information from all the beacons that a sensor node 
receives, it computes its approximate position based 
on the coordinates of the locators. The sensor node 
computes  an  overlapping  antenna  region  using  a 
majority vote scheme. The final position of the sensor 
node  is  determined  by  computing  the  center  of 
gravity of the overlapping antenna region. 
 
Time  synchronization:  Most  of  the  applications  in 
sensor  networks  require  time  synchronization.  Any 
security  mechanism  for  Wireless  Sensor  Network 
(WSN)  should  also  be  time-synchronized.  A 
collaborative Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)  may 
require synchronization among a group of sensors. In 
[11],  the  authors  have  proposed  a  set  of  secure 
synchronization  protocols  for  multi-hop  sender 
receiver and group synchronization. 
 
Authentication:  It  ensures  that  the  communicating 
node is the one that it claims to be. An adversary can 
not only change data packets but also can change a 
packet stream by  injecting  fabricated packets. It is, 
therefore,  necessary  for  a  receiver  to  have  a 
mechanism to verify that the received packets have 
indeed come from the genuine sender node. In case of 
communication  between  the  two  nodes,  data 
authentication  can  be  achieved  through  a  Message 
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shared  secret  key  among  the  nodes.  A  number  of 
authentication schemes for Wireless Sensor Network 
(WSN)s have been proposed by researchers. Most of 
these schemes for secure routing and reliable packet. 
 
III.  Typical Layer based Attacks in 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
3.1 Attacks in Physical Layer  
The  physical  layer  is  responsible  for  carrier 
frequency  generation,  frequency  selection, 
modulation, signal detection and data encryption [1]. 
As with any radio-based medium, the possibility of 
jamming is there. In addition, nodes in WSNs may be 
deployed in hostile or insecure environments where 
an  attacker  has  the  physical  access.  Three  types  of 
attacks in physical layer are (i) Jamming (ii) Device 
tampering and (iii) Eavesdropping 
 
Jamming: It is a type of attack which interferes with 
the radio frequencies that the nodes use in a Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN) for communication [12,13]. 
A jamming source may be powerful enough to disrupt 
the  entire  network.  Still  less  powerful  jamming 
sources,  an  opponent  can  potentially  disrupt 
communication in the entire network by strategically 
distributing  the  jamming  sources.  Even  an 
intermittent  jamming  may  prove  detrimental  as  the 
message  communication  in  a  Wireless  Sensor 
Network  (WSN)  may  be  extremely  time-sensitive 
[12]. 
 
Device  Tampering:  Sensor  networks  typically 
operate in outdoor environments. Due to distributed 
and unattended nature, the nodes in a WSN are highly 
susceptible  to  physical  attacks  [14].  The  physical 
attacks may cause irreversible damage the nodes. The 
adversary  can  extract  cryptographic  keys  from  the 
captured  node,  tamper    its  circuitry,  modify  the 
program  codes  or  even  replace  it  with  a  malicious 
sensor [16]. It has been shown that sensor nodes such 
as MICA2  motes can be compromised in less than 
one minute time [15]. 
 
Eavesdropping:  Without  senders  and  receivers’ 
awareness,  eavesdropping  [17,  18,  19]  attackers 
monitor the traffic in transmission on communication 
channels and collect data that can later be analyzed to 
extract  sensitive  information.  Wireless  Sensor 
Network (WSN)s  are especially vulnerable to such 
attacks  since  wireless  transmission  is  the  dominant 
method  of  communication  used  by  sensors.  During 
transmission, wireless signals are broadcast in the air 
and thus accessible to the public. Modest equipment, 
attackers within the sender’s transmission range can 
easily plug themselves into the wireless channel and 
obtain  raw  data.  By  and  large,  the  capability  of 
eavesdropping  depends  on  the  power  of  antennas. 
The more powerful the antennas, the weaker signals 
attackers  can  receive,  and  the  more  data  can  be 
collected. Since eavesdropping is a passive behavior, 
such attacks are infrequently detectable. 
 
3.2 Countermeasures in Physical Layer 
Some attacks in the physical layer are somewhat 
hard to cope with. For example, following sensors are 
deployed in the field, it’s difficult to prevent every 
single  sensor  from  device  tampering.  Therefore, 
although there are some mechanisms that attempt to 
reduce the occurrences of attacks, extra of them focus 
on protecting information from divulgence. 
 
Access Restriction: Obviously, restricting adversaries 
from physically accessing or getting close to sensors 
is  effective  on  all  the  attacks  aforementioned.  It  is 
good  to  have  such  restrictions  if  we  can,  but 
unfortunately, they are either difficult or infeasible in 
most cases. Therefore, we usually have to fall back 
on another type of restrictions: communication media 
access restriction. 
A  few  techniques  exist  nowadays  that  prevent 
attackers from accessing the wireless medium in use, 
including  sleeping/hibernating  and  spread  spectrum 
communication [20]. The former is fairly simple as it 
switches off sensors and keeps them silent until the 
attackers go away. However, its effectiveness is at the 
expense of sacrificing the operations of WSNs. The 
latter  is  more  intelligent,  with  frequencies  varying 
deliberately.  This  technique  uses  either  analog 
schemes where the frequency variation is continuous, 
or digital schemes (e.g. frequency hopping) where the 
frequency variation is abrupt. By this way, attackers 
cannot easily locate the communication channel, and 
are thus restrained from attacking.  
 
With  current  technology,  powerful  devices  are 
required  to  perform  such  functionalities.  Therefore, 
spread spectrum communications are not yet feasible 
for WSNs that are usually constrained in resources. 
Nonetheless,  given  the  rapid  advancement  of 
technologies, this technique is very promising in the 
future. 
Directional  antenna  [21,  22,  23,  24,  25]  is  another 
technique  for  access  restriction.  By  confining  the 
directions  of  the  signal  propagation,  it  reduces  the 
chances of adversaries accessing the communication 
channel.  Again,  similar  to  spread  spectrum 
communication, its production cost is high at present 
and  unsuitable  for  large-scale  sensor  networks,  but 
may be more useful in the long run. 
 
Encryption:  In  general,  cryptography  is  the  all-
purpose solution to achieve security goals in WSNs. 
To  protect  data  confidentiality,  cryptography  is 
indispensable.  Cryptography  can  be  applied  to  the 
data stored on sensors. Once data are encrypted, even 
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adversaries to obtain useful information. Of course, 
the  strength  of  the  encryption  depends  on  various 
factors.  A  more  costly  encryption  can  yield  higher 
strength, but it also drains the limited precious energy 
faster  and  needs  more  memory.  More  often, 
cryptography is applied to the data in transmission. 
There are basically two categories of cryptographic 
mechanisms:  asymmetric  and  symmetric.  In 
asymmetric mechanisms RSA [26, 27, 28], the keys 
used  for  encryption  and  decryption  are  different, 
allowing  for  easier  key  distribution.  It  usually 
requires  a  third  trusted  party  called  Certificate 
Authority (CA) to distribute and check certificates so 
that the identity of the users using a certain key can 
be verified. However, due to the lack of a priori trust 
relationship and infrastructure support, it is infeasible 
to  have  CAs  in  WSNs.  Furthermore,  asymmetric 
cryptography usually consumes more resources such 
as computation and memory. 
 
3.3 Attacks in Data Link Layer 
The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of 
data-streams,  data  frame  detection,  medium  access 
control,  and  error  control  [1].  Attacks  at  this  layer 
include  purposefully  created  collisions,  resource 
exhaustion, and unfairness in allocation. A collision 
occurs  when  two  nodes  attempt  to  transmit  on  the 
same  frequency  simultaneously  [12].  When  packets 
collide, they are discarded and need to re-transmitted. 
An  adversary  may  strategically  cause  collisions  in 
specific  packets  such  as  ACK  control  messages.  A 
possible  result  of  such  collisions  is  the  costly 
exponential  back-off.  The  adversary  may  simply 
violate the communication protocol and continuously 
transmit  messages  in  an  attempt  to  generate 
collisions. Repeated collisions can also be used by an 
attacker  to  cause  resource  exhaustion  [12].  For 
example,  a  naïve  link  layer  implementation  may 
continuously  attempt  to  retransmit  the  corrupted 
packets.  Unless  these  retransmissions  are  detected 
early,  the  energy  levels  of  the  nodes  would  be 
exhausted quickly. Unfairness is a weak form of DoS 
attack  [12].  An  attacker  may  cause  unfairness  by 
intermittently using the above link layer attacks. In 
this  case,  the  adversary  causes  degradation  of  real-
time  applications  running  on  other  nodes  by 
intermittently disrupting their frame transmissions. 
 
Traffic Manipulation: The wireless communication 
in WSNs (and other wireless networks) can be easily 
manipulated  in  the  MAC  layer.  Attackers  can 
transmit packets right at the moment when legitimate 
users do so to cause excessive packet collisions. The 
timing  can  be  readily  decided  by  monitoring  the 
channel  and  doing  some  calculations  based  on  the 
MAC  protocol  in  effect.  The  artificially  increased 
contention will decrease signal quality and network 
availability,  and  will  thus  dramatically  reduce  the 
network throughput [29, 30]. Besides, in widely used 
MAC  schemes  where  packet  transmissions  are 
carefully  coordinated,  attackers  can  compete  for 
channel  usage  aggressively  disobeying  the 
coordination rules [31, 32, 33]. This misbehavior can 
break  the  operations  of  the  protocols  and  result  in 
unfair bandwidth usage. In either way, the network 
performance  is  degraded.  Eventually,  the  collisions 
and unfairness lead traffic distortion. 
 
Identity Spoofing: MAC identity spoofing is another 
common attack in the MAC layer [34]. Due to the 
broadcast  nature  of  wireless  communications,  the 
MAC  identity  (such  as  a  MAC  address  or  a 
certificate) of a sensor is open to all the neighbors, 
including attackers. Without proper protection on it, 
an attacker can fake an identity and pretend to be a 
different one. A typical MAC identity spoofing attack 
is  the  Sybil  attack  [35,  36],  in  which  an  attacker 
illegally presents multiple MAC identities.  
 
To gain access to the network or hide, an attacker can 
spoof as a normal legitimate sensor. It can even spoof 
as  a  base  station  or  aggregation  point  to  obtain 
unauthorized privileges or resources of the WSN. If 
successful,  the  entire  network  could  be  taken  over. 
Spoofing  attacks  are  usually  the  basis  of  further 
cross-layer  attacks  that  can  cause  serious 
consequences.  
 
3.4 Countermeasures in Data Link Layer 
To  counter  attacks  in  the  MAC  layer,  current 
research  focuses  on  detection.  It  allows  for  many 
kinds of further actions to stop the attacks, such as 
excluding  the  attacking  nodes  from  interactions. 
There also exist some prevention approaches, which 
are mainly against spoofing attacks. Many solutions 
presented  below  are  actually  proposed  for  ad  hoc 
networks. We believe they can be easily extended to 
wireless sensor networks. 
 
Misbehavior Detection: Because attacks deviate from 
normal behaviors, it is possible to identify attackers 
by observing what has happened. Various data can be 
collected for this purpose, and various actions can be 
taken after detection. 
In  a  countering  scheme  [37]  for  the  IEEE  802.11 
protocol, a receiver assigns and adjusts the back off 
values  to  be  used  by  the  corresponding  sender. 
Whenever  detecting  the  sender’s  misbehavior  in 
manipulating  back  off  value,  the  receiver  may  add 
some penalty to the next back off value assigned to 
the sender. The idea was applied to ad hoc networks 
[33], and similarly can also be applied to WSNs. 
 
Identity  Protection  :  Identity  can  be  treated  as  yet 
another kind of information whose legitimacy needs 
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authentication  can  be  used  to  prevent  identity 
spoofing.  Since  most  authentication  schemes  are 
designed  for  the  network  layer  and  the  application 
layer. 
Identity-key association [36] can also help to reduce 
false identities. The key idea is to associate the node 
identity  with  keys  used  by  the  node  in 
communication. An attacker can impersonate a node 
in  front  of  another  only  if  the  communication  key 
shared by them is cracked. 
 
3.5 Attacks in the Network Layer 
The network layer of WSNs is vulnerable to the 
different types of attacks such as: (i) spoofed routing 
information  ,  (ii)  selective  packet  forwarding,  (iii) 
sinkhole, (iv) Sybil, (v) wormhole, (vi) hello flood, 
(vii) acknowledgment spoofing, (viii) Black Hole,(x) 
False  Routing,(xi)  Packet  Replication    etc.  These 
attacks are described briefly in the following: 
 
 
Spoofed routing information: The most direct attack 
against  a  routing  protocol  is  to  target  the  routing 
information in the network. An attacker may spoof, 
alter, or replay routing information to disrupt traffic 
in  the  network  [38].  These  disruptions  include 
creation  of  routing  loops,  attracting  or  repelling 
network  traffic  from  selected  nodes,  extending  or 
shortening  source  routes,  generating  fake  error 
messages,  causing  network  partitioning,  and 
increasing end-to-end latency. 
 
Selective forwarding: In a multi-hop network like a 
WSN, for message communication all the nodes need 
to  forward  messages  accurately.  An  attacker  may 
compromise a node in such a way that it selectively 
forwards some messages and drops others [38]. 
 
Sinkhole: In a sinkhole attack, an attacker makes a 
compromised  node  look  more  attractive  to  its 
neighbors by forging the routing information [39, 38, 
40]. The result is that the neighbor nodes choose the 
compromised node as the next-hop node to route their 
data  through.  This  type  of  attack  makes  selective 
forwarding very simple as all traffic from a large area 
in the network would flow through the compromised 
node. 
 
Sybil attack: It is an attack where one node presents 
more than one identity in a network. It was originally 
described as an attack intended to defeat the objective 
of redundancy mechanisms in distributed data storage 
systems in peer-to peer networks [41]. Newsome et al 
describe this attack from the perspective of a WSN 
[39]. In addition to defeating distributed data storage 
systems,  the  Sybil  attack  is  also  effective  against 
routing  algorithms,  data  aggregation,  voting,  fair 
resource  allocation,  and  foiling  misbehavior 
detection.  Regardless  of  the  target  (voting,  routing, 
aggregation), the Sybil algorithm functions similarly. 
All  of  the  techniques  involve  utilizing  multiple 
identities.  For  instance,  in  a  sensor  network  voting 
scheme,  the  Sybil  attack  might  utilize  multiple 
identities to generate additional “votes”. Similarly, to 
attack  the  routing  protocol,  the  Sybil  attack  would 
rely  on  a  malicious  node  taking  on  the  identity  of 
multiple  nodes,  and  thus  routing  multiple  paths 
through a single malicious node. 
 
Wormhole: A wormhole is low latency link between 
two  portions  of  a  network  over  which  an  attacker 
replays  network  messages  [38].  This  link  may  be 
established  either  by  a  single  node  forwarding 
messages  between  two  adjacent  but  otherwise  non-
neighboring nodes or by a pair of nodes in different 
parts of the network communicating with each other. 
The latter case is closely related to sinkhole attack as 
an attacking node near the base station can provide a 
one-hop  link  to  that  base  station  via  the  other 
attacking node in a distant part of the network. 
Hello  flood:  Most  of  the  protocols  that  use  Hello 
packets  make  the  naïve  assumption  that  receiving 
such  a  packet  implies  that  the  sender  is  within  the 
radio range of the receiver. An attacker  may use a 
high-powered transmitter to fool a large number of 
nodes and make them believe that they are within its 
neighborhood [38]. Subsequently, the attacker node 
falsely broadcasts a shorter route to the base station, 
and all the nodes which received the Hello packets, 
attempt  to  transmit  to  the  attacker  node.  However, 
these nodes are out of the radio range of the attacker. 
 
Acknowledgment spoofing: Some routing algorithms 
for  WSNs  require  transmission  of  acknowledgment 
packets.  An  attacking  node  may  overhear  packet 
transmissions from its neighboring nodes and spoof 
the  acknowledgments  thereby  providing  false 
information  to  the  nodes  [38].  In  this  way,  the 
attacker  is  able  to  disseminate  wrong  information 
about the status of the nodes. 
 
Black  Hole:  The  black  hole  attack  is  one  of  the 
simplest  routing  attacks  in  WSNs.  In  a  black  hole 
attack, the attacker swallows (i.e. receives but does 
not forward) all the messages he receives, just as a 
black  hole  absorbing  everything  passing  by.  By 
refusing  to  forward  any  message  he  receives,  the 
attacker will affect all the traffic flowing through it. 
Hence, the throughput of a subset of nodes, especially 
the neighboring nodes around the attacker and with 
traffic through it, is dramatically decreased. Different 
locations of the attacker induce different influences 
on the network. If the attacker is located close to the 
base station, all the traffic going to the base station 
might  need  to  go  through  the  attacker.  Obviously, 
black  hole  attacks  in  this  case  can  break  the Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
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communication between the base station and the rest 
of the WSN, and effectively prevent the WSN from 
serving  its  purposes.  In  contrast,  if  a  black  hole 
attacking node is at the edge of the WSN, probably 
very few sensors need it to communicate with others. 
Therefore, the harm can be very limited. 
 
False Routing: As the name suggests, false routing 
attacks [42] are launched by enforcing false routing 
information. There are three different approaches of 
enforcement [42]: 
 
• Overflowing routing tables 
• Poisoning routing tables 
• Poisoning routing caches 
 
Packet Replication: In this type of attacks, attackers 
resend  (replicate)  packets  previously  received  from 
other nodes. The packets can be broadcasted to the 
entire  network  (called  flooding  attack),  or  to  a 
particular  set  of  nodes.  They  can  also  resent 
irrespective of whether the sender is sending any new 
packets  or  not.  With  large  amount  of  packets 
replayed, both the bandwidth of the network and the 
power of the nodes are consumed in vain, which leads 
to early termination of network operations. 
 
3.6 Countermeasures in Network Layer 
Since  the  functionalities  of  the  network  layer 
require  the  close  collaboration  of  many  nodes,  all 
these  nodes  have  to  be  enclosed  for  security 
consideration.  It  is  therefore  relatively  difficult  to 
mitigate attacks. Nonetheless, some countermeasures 
are available as follows: 
• Routing Access Restriction 
• False Routing Information Detection 
• Wormhole Detection 
 
Routing Access Restriction: Routing may be one of 
the most attractive attack targets in WSNs, as we saw 
in  the  previous  subsection.  If  we  can  exclude 
attackers from participating in the routing process, i.e. 
restrict them from accessing routing, a large number 
of attacks in the network layer will be prevented or 
alleviated. Multi-path routing is one of the methods to 
reduce  the  effectiveness  of  attacks  launched  by 
attackers  on  routing  paths  [43,  44,  45].  In  these 
schemes, packets are routed through multiple paths. 
Even if the attacker on one of the paths breaks down 
the path, the routing is not necessarily broken as other 
paths still exist. This alleviates the impact of routing 
attacks, although does not prevent these attacks. 
 
False  Routing  Information  Detection:  Sometimes 
attackers  do  have  chances  to  send  false  routing 
information  into  the  network,  e.g.  during  route 
discovery  stages.  If  the  false  information  does  not 
lead  to  network  failure  such  as  broken  routes,  we 
really cannot do  much about it. Otherwise,  we can 
apply the idea of misbehavior detection. For example, 
watchdog [47] or IDS [51, 48, 49] may find that some 
node fails to route messages along the routing path 
due to the wrong information it keeps. This anomaly 
of route failure may trigger out an alarm. Nodes can 
start to trace the source of false routing information. 
Reputation  [51,  50]  can  also  be  maintained, 
depending  on  whether  nodes  are  providing  valid 
routing  information.  Nonetheless,  how  to  trace  the 
source of routing information can be a very difficult 
problem. 
 
Wormhole Detection : Wormhole attacks are difficult 
to deal with because the information they inject into 
the networks is real. The most recent research work 
on  the  countermeasures  focuses  on  the  following 
techniques: 
 
•  Using  synchronized  clocks  [46].  With  the 
assumption  that  all  nodes  are  tightly  synchronized, 
each packet includes the time at which it is sent out. 
When receiving the packet, the receiver compares this 
value to the time at which it receives the packet. With 
the  knowledge  of  transmission  distance  and 
consumed time, the receiver is able to detect if the 
packet  has  traveled  too  far.  If  the  transmission 
distance is far beyond the maximum allowed travel 
distance, probably it is under wormhole attacks. 
• Using directional antennas [21]. Directional antenna 
is used to discover neighboring nodes identified by 
zone. The zones around each sensor are numbered 1 
to N oriented clockwise starting with zone 1 facing 
east. After receiving signals from unknown nodes, a 
node can get approximate direction information based 
on received signals and identify the unknown node by 
zone.  After  that  it  cooperates  with  its  neighboring 
nodes to verify the legitimacy of the unknown node, 
e.g. by checking whether the unknown node is known 
by the neighboring nodes. 
• Using Multidimensional Scaling - Visualization of 
Wormhole  (MDS-VOW)[52].  MDS-VOW  first 
constructs  the  layout  of  the  network.  If  there  exist 
wormhole  attackers,  the  shape  of  the  constructed 
network  layout  will  show  some  bent/distorted 
features. 
 
3.7  Attacks in Transport layer  
The attacks that can be launched on the transport 
layer  in  a  WSN  are  flooding  attack  and  de-
synchronization attack.  
 
Flooding:  Whenever  a  protocol  is  required  to 
maintain  state  at  either  end  of  a  connection,  it 
becomes  vulnerable  to  memory  exhaustion  through 
flooding [12]. An attacker may repeatedly make new 
connection  request  until  the  resources  required  by 
each connection are exhausted or reach a maximum Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
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limit. In either case, further legitimate requests will 
be ignored. 
 
De-synchronization: De-synchronization refers to the 
disruption of an existing connection [12]. An attacker 
may, for example, repeatedly spoof messages to an 
end  host  causing  the  host  to  request  the 
retransmission of missed frames. If timed correctly, 
an attacker may degrade or even prevent the ability of 
the end hosts to successfully exchange data causing 
them instead to waste energy attempting to recover 
from errors which never really exist. 
 
3.8 Countermeasures in Transport Layer 
One  way  to  provide  message  confidentiality  in 
transport  layer  is  point-to-point  or  end-to  end 
communication  through  data  encryption.  Though 
TCP is the main connection oriented reliable protocol 
in  Internet,  it  does  not  fit  well  in  MANET.  TCP 
feedback  (TCP-F)  [53],  TCP  explicit  failure 
notification  (TCP-ELFN)  [53],  ad-hoc  transmission 
control protocol (ATCP) [53], and ad hoc transport 
protocol  (ATP)  have  been  developed  but  none  of 
them  covers  security  issues  involved  in  MANET. 
Secure  Socket  Layer  (SSL)  [54],  Transport  Layer 
Security  (TLS)  [54]  and  Private  Communications 
Transport (PCT) [54] protocols were designed on the 
basis  of  public  key  cryptography  to  provide  secure 
communications.  TLS/SSL  provides  protection 
against  masquerade  attacks,  man-in-middle  attacks, 
rollback attacks, and replay attacks. 
 
3.9Attacks in the Application Layer 
Attacks in this layer have the knowledge of data 
semantics, and thus can manipulate the data to change 
the semantics. As the result, false data are presented 
to applications and lead to abnormal actions. In this 
section, the following attacks will be discussed: 
 
• Malicious Code Attacks  
• Repudiation Attacks 
• Clock Skewing 
• Selective Message Forwarding 
• Data Aggregation Distortion 
 
Malicious  Code  Attacks:  Various  malicious  codes 
such  as  virus,  worm,  spy-wares  and  Trojan  horse 
attack both operating systems and user applications 
that cause the computer system and network to slow 
down or even damaged. An attacker can produce this 
type of attacks in MANET and can seek their desire 
information [55]. 
 
Repudiation Attacks: The solution that taken to solve 
authentication or non-repudiation attacks in network 
layer  or  in  transport  layer  is  not  enough.  Because, 
repudiation refers to a denial of participation in the 
communication. Example of repudiation attack on a 
commercial  system:  a  selfish  person  could  deny 
conducting an operation on a credit card purchase or 
deny any on-line transaction [55]. 
 
Clock Skewing: The targets of this attack are those 
sensors in need of synchronized operations [13, 56, 
57]. By disseminating false  timing information, the 
attacks aim to desynchronize the sensors (i.e. skew 
their clocks). 
 
Selective Message Forwarding: For this attack, the 
adversary has to be on the path between the source 
and  the  destination,  and  is  thus  responsible  for 
forwarding packet for the source. The attack can be 
launched  by  forwarding  some  or  partial  messages 
selectively  but  not  others.  Note  that  the  attack  is 
different from the other selective forwarding attack in 
the network layer. To launch the selective forwarding 
attack  in  the  application  layer,  attackers  need  to 
understand  the  semantics  of  the  payload  of  the 
application layer packets (i.e. treat each packet as a 
meaningful  message  instead  of  a  monolithic  unit), 
and select the packets to be forwarded based on the 
semantics. 
 
Data Aggregation Distortion: Once data is collected, 
sensors  usually  send  it  back  to  base  stations  for 
processing.  Attackers  may  maliciously  modify  the 
data to be aggregated, and make the final aggregation 
results  computed  by  the  base  stations  distorted. 
Consequently, the base stations will have an incorrect 
view of the environment  monitored by the sensors, 
and may take inappropriate actions. Data aggregation 
can  be  totally  disrupted  if  black  hole  or  sinkhole 
attacks  are  launched.  In  this  scenario,  no  data  can 
reach the base stations. However, for those attacks, 
only  the  network  layer  knowledge  is  required. 
Therefore,  they  are  categorized  as  network  layer 
attacks. 
 
3.10 Countermeasures in the Application Layer 
As  presented  above,  attacks  in  the  application 
layer rely on application data semantics. Therefore, 
the countermeasures focus on protecting the integrity 
and confidentiality of data, no matter it is for control 
or not.  
 
Data Integrity Protection: In general, authentication 
can be used to protect any data integrity. Nodes can 
use  end-to-end,  hop-to-hop  or  multipath 
authentication depending on the cost they can afford 
and  the  security  level  they  desire.  When 
authentication  is  not  adopted,  e.g.  for  feasibility 
reasons,  or  when  data  integrity  is  somehow 
compromised,  the  misbehavior  detection  techniques 
can be applied. The differences lie in the data to be 
observed  in  order  to  collect  proofs  of  anomalies. 
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detect  such  attacks,  timing  information  in 
synchronization  packets  should  be  watched.  When 
readings  (the  data  collected  by  sensors  about  the 
monitored  environment)  are  considered,  some 
specific  detection  mechanisms  have  been  proposed, 
and are referred to as false reading detection. With an 
assumption  that  the  faulty/compromised  sensors 
produce  readings  remarkably  deviated  from  the 
normal condition, an outlier detection algorithm [58] 
can locate such sensors by comparing their readings 
with those of their neighbors. In the online deviation 
detection  scheme  [59],  an  estimation  of  the  data 
distribution  is  computed  through  the  input  data 
stream of the WSN. If the current reading of a sensor 
remarkably  deviates  from  the  data  distribution 
(namely the normal readings in the WSN), this sensor 
will  be  detected  as  an  outlier.  There  is  also  a 
centralized  approach  [60].  Base  stations  launch 
marked 
packets  to  probe  certain  sensors  and  try  to  route 
packets through them. If a sensor fails to respond, the 
base stations may conclude that this node is dead. 
 
Data  Confidentiality  Protection:  Encryption  is  an 
effective  approach  to  prevent  attackers  from 
understanding  captured  data.  Similar  to 
authentication,  the  principles  of  encryption  do  not 
change for use in different layers.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Security  in  wireless  sensor  networks  has 
attracted a lot of attention in the recent years. In this 
paper,  a  survey  is  given  on  existing  and  possible 
attacks in wireless sensor networks. The attacks are 
classified according to the OSI stack model. For each 
layer of Physical, Data link, Network Transport and 
Application,  we  have  discussed  several  typical 
attacks that exploit the characteristics of that layer. 
We  have  also  covered  the  countermeasures  and 
potential  solutions  against  those  attacks,  with  the 
complete comparison between Layer based Attacks in 
Wireless Sensor Networks and mentioned some open 
research issues. By reading the paper, the readers can 
have a better view of attacks and countermeasures in 
wireless sensor networks, and find their way to start 
secure  designs  for  these  networks.
 
 
 
The evaluation of different Layer based Attacks and possible counter measure in Wireless Sensor 
Networks have been shown in the table 1. 
 
Table.1. Typical Layer based Attacks and possible counter measure in Wireless Sensor Networks. 
 
S.No
.  
Layer   Attacks  Counter measure  
1   Physical Layer   •Jamming  
•Node Tampering  
•Eavesdropping  
•.Access Restriction, 
•Encryption 
2.   Data Link Layer   •Traffic Manipulation  
•Identity Spoofing 
•Misbehavior Detection,  
•Identity Protection 
3.   Network Layer   •Spoofed routing information  
•Sybil attack 
•Wormhole 
•Hello flood 
•Acknowledgment spoofing 
•Black Hole 
•False Routing  
• Packet Replication 
•Routing Access Restriction 
•False Routing Information Detection 
• Wormhole Detection 
 
4.   Transport Layer   •Flooding  
•De-synchronization 
•Limiting Connection Numbers 
•Authentication  
5.   Application Layer   • Malicious Code Attacks  
• Repudiation Attacks 
• Clock Skewing 
• Selective Message Forwarding 
• Data Aggregation Distortion 
 
•Data Integrity Protection,  
•Data Confidentiality Protection 
 Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 10( Part -1), October 2014, pp.04-15 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                12 | P a g e  
REFERENCES 
[1]  I.  F.  Akyildiz,  W.  Su,  Y. 
Sankarasubramaniam,  and  E.  Cayirci,  “A 
survey  on  sensor  networks”,  IEEE 
Communications Magazine, Vol. 40, No. 8, 
pp. 102-114, August 2002. 
[2].  Daojing  He,Lin  cui,Hejiao  Hang,”Design 
and  verification  of  Enhanced  secure 
localization  scheme  in  wireless  sensor 
network “IEEE Transaction On parallel and 
distributed systems vol. 20 no.7 July 2009 
[3].  S.  Uluagac,  C.  Lee,  R.  Beyah,  and  J. 
Copeland,  “Designing  Secure  Protocols  for 
Wireless  Sensor  Networks,”  Wireless 
Algorithms, Systems, and Applications, vol. 
5258, pp. 503-514, Springer, 2008 
[4]  D.W.  Carman,  P.S.  Krus,  and  B.J.  Matt, 
“Constraints  and  approaches  for  distributed 
sensor  network  security”,  Technical  Report 
00-010, NAI Labs, Network Associates Inc., 
Glenwood, MD, 2000. 
[5]  A.  Perrig,  R.  Szewczyk,  V.  Wen,  D.E. 
Culler,  and  J.D.  Tygar,  “SPINS:  Security 
protocols  for  sensor  networks”,  Wireless 
Networks,  Vol.8  ,  No.  5,  pp.  521-534, 
September 2002. 
[6]  L.  Eschenauer  and  V.D.  Gligor,  “A  key-
management  scheme  for  distributed  sensor 
networks”,  In  Proceedings  of  the  9th  ACM 
Conference  on  Computer  and  Networking, 
pp. 41- 47, Nov 2002. 
[7]  H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random 
key  pre-distribution  schemes  for  sensor 
networks”,  In  Proceedings  of  the  IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp.197, 
IEEE Computer Society, May 2003. 
[8]  D.  Liu,  P.  Ning,  and  R.  Li,  “Establishing 
pair-wise  keys  in  distributed  sensor 
networks”,  ACM  Transactions  on 
Information Systems Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
pp. 41-77, 2005. 
[9]  S.  Capkun  and  J.-P.  Hubaux,  “Secure 
positioning  in    wireless  networks”,  IEEE 
Journal  on  Selected  Areas  in 
Communications,  Vol.  24,  No.  2,  pp.  221-
232, 2006. 
[10]  L.  Lazos  and  R.  Poovendran,  “SERLOC: 
Robust  localization  for  wireless  sensor 
networks”,  ACM  Transactions  on  Sensor 
Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.73-100, 2005. 
[11]  S.  Ganeriwal,  S.  Capkun,  C.-C.  Han,  and 
M.B.  Srivastava,  “Secure  time 
synchronization  service  for  sensor 
networks”,  In  Proceedings  of  the  4th  ACM 
Workshop on Wireless Security, pp. 97-106, 
New York, NY, USA, 2005, ACM Press. 
[12]  A.D. Wood and J.A. Stankovic,  “Denial of 
service in sensor networks”, IEEE Computer, 
Vol. 35, No. 10, pp. 54-62, 2002. 
[13]  E.  Shi  and  A.  Perrig,  “Designing  secure 
sensor  networks”,  Wireless  Communication 
Magazine,  Vol.  11,  No.  6,  pp.  38-43, 
December 2004. 
[14]  X. Wang, W. Gu, K. Schosek, S. Chellappan, 
and D. Xuan, “Sensor network configuration 
under  physical  attacks,”,  Technical  report 
(OSU-CISRC-7/04-TR45),  Department  of 
Computer  Science  and  Engineering,  Ohio 
State University, July 2004. 
[15]  C. Hartung, J. Balasalle, and R. Han, “Node 
compromise  in  sensor  networks:  The  need 
for  secure  systems”,  Technical  Report  CU-
CS-988-04,  Department  of  Computer 
Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, 
2004. 
[16]  X. Wang, W. Gu, S. Chellappan, Dong Xuan, 
and  Ten  H.  Laii,  “Search-based  physical 
attacks  in  sensor  networks:  Modeling  and 
defense,  Technical  report,  Department  of 
Computer  Science  and  Engineering,  Ohio 
State University, February 2005. 
[17]  M.  Franklin,  Z.  Galil,  andM.  Yung, 
“Eavesdropping  games:  a  graph-theoretic 
approach to privacy in distributed systems,” 
J. ACM, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 225– 243, 2000. 
[18]  M.  Abadi  and  J.  J&#252;rjens,  “Formal 
eavesdropping  and  its  computational 
interpretation,” in TACS ’01: Proceedings of 
the  4th  International  Symposium  on 
Theoretical  Aspects  of  Computer  Software. 
London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2001, pp. 82–
94. 
[19]  K. D. Murray, Security Scrapbook Espionage 
and  Privacy  News  of  the  Week.  [Online]. 
Available:  http: 
//www.spybusters.com/SS0210.html. 
[20]  [Online].  Available:  http: 
//www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1455.html 
[21]  L.  Hu  and  D.  Evans,  “Using  directional 
antennas  to  prevent  wormhole  attacks,”  in 
Network  and  Distributed  System  Security 
Symposium (NDSS), 2004. 
[22]  R.  R.  Choudhury,  X.  Yang,  N.  H.  Vaidya, 
and  R.  Ramanathan,  “Using  directional 
antennas for medium access control in ad hoc 
networks,” in MobiCom ’02: Proceedings of 
the  8th  annual  international  conference  on 
Mobile  computing  and  networking.  New 
York, NY, USA: ACMPress, 2002, pp. 59–
70. 
[23]  S. Yi, Y. Pei, and S. Kalyanaraman, “On the 
capacity  improvement  of  ad  hoc  wireless Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 10( Part -1), October 2014, pp.04-15 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                13 | P a g e  
networks  using  directional  antennas,”  in 
MobiHoc ’03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM 
international  symposium  on  Mobile  ad  hoc 
networking  &  computing.  New  York,  NY, 
USA: ACM Press, 2003, pp. 108–116. 
[24]  M.  Takai,  J.  Martin,  R.  Bagrodia,  and  A. 
Ren, “Directional virtual carrier sensing for 
directional  antennas  in  mobile  ad  hoc 
networks,” in MobiHoc ’02: Proceedings of 
the  3rd  ACM  international  symposium  on 
Mobile  ad  hoc  networking  &  computing. 
New  York,  NY,  USA:  ACM  Press,  2002, 
pp.183–193. 
[25]  R. Ramanathan, “On the performance of ad 
hoc  networks  with  beamforming  antennas,” 
in  MobiHoc  ’01:  Proceedings  of  the  2nd 
ACM international symposium on Mobile ad 
hoc  networking  &  computing.  New  York, 
NY, USA: ACM Press, 2001, pp. 95–105. 
[26]  L.  Zhou  and  Z.  J.  Haas,  “Securing  ad  hoc 
networks,” IEEE Network, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 
24–30, 1999.  
[27]  J.-P.  Hubaux,  L.  Butty&#225;n,  and  S. 
Capkun, “The quest for security in mobile ad 
hoc networks,” in MobiHoc ’01: Proceedings 
of the 2nd ACM international symposium on 
Mobile  ad  hoc  networking  &  computing. 
ACM Press, 2001, pp. 146–155. 
[28]  “Providing  robust  and  ubiquitous  security 
support  for  mobile  ad  hoc  networks,”  in 
ICNP  ’01:  Proceedings  of  the  Ninth 
International  Conference  on  Network 
Protocols  (ICNP’01).  IEEE  Computer 
Society, 2001, p. 251. 
[29]  V. Gupta, S. Krishnamurthy, and M. 
Faloutsos, “Denial of service attacks at the 
mac layer in wireless ad hoc networks.” 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/krish/milcomvik.pdf 
[30]  I. A. Jean-Pierre, “Denial of service 
resilience in ad hoc networks.” [Online]. 
Available: 
http://lcawww.epfl.ch/Publications/aad/aadH
K04.pdf 
[31]  A. D. Wood and J. A. Stankovic, “Denial of 
service  in  sensor  networks,”Computer,  vol. 
35, no. 10, pp. 54–62, 2002. 
[32]  P.  Michiardi  and  R.  Molva,  “Prevention  of 
denial  of  service  attacks  and  selfishness  in 
mobile ad hoc networks,” in Institut Eurecom 
Research Report RR-02-063, 2002. 
[33]  A.  A.  Cardenas,  S.  Radosavac,  and  J.  S. 
Baras,  “Detection  and  prevention  of  mac 
layer  misbehavior  in  ad  hoc  networks,”  in 
Proceedings  of  the  2nd  ACM  workshop  on 
security  of  ad  hoc  and  sensor  networks, 
2004. 
[34]  E.  D.  Cardenas,  “Mac  spoofing–an 
introduction,” 2003. [Online]. Available: http 
:  //www.giac.org/practical/GSEC/EdgarC 
ardenasGSEC.pdf 
[35]  J. R. Douceur, “The sybil attack,” in IPTPS 
’01:  Revised  Papers  from  the  First 
International  Workshop  on  Peer-to-Peer 
Systems.  Springer-Verlag,  2002,  pp.  251–
260. 
[36]  J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, and A. Perrig, 
“The  sybil  attack  in  sensor  networks: 
analysis  &  defenses,”  in  IPSN’04: 
Proceedings  of  the  third  international 
symposium  on  Information  processing  in 
sensor networks. ACM Press, 2004, pp. 259–
268. 
[37]  P.  Kyasanur  and  N.  H.  Vaidya,  “Detection 
and  handling  of  mac  layer  misbehavior  in 
wireless networks.” in DSN, 2003, pp. 173–
182.  
[38]  C. Karlof and D. Wagner, “Secure routing in 
wireless  sensor  networks:  Attacks  and 
countermeasures”, In Proceedings of the 1
st 
IEEE  International  Workshop  on  Sensor 
Network  Protocols  and  Applications,  May 
2003, pp. 113-127. 
[39]  J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, and A. Perrig, 
“The  Sybil  attack  in  sensor  networks: 
Analysis  and  defenses”,  In  Proceedings  of 
the  3
rd  International  Symposium  on 
Information Processing in Sensor Networks, 
pp. 259-268, ACM Press 2004. 
[40]  A.D. Wood and J.A. Stankovic,  “Denial of 
service in sensor networks”, IEEE Computer, 
Vol. 35, No. 10, pp. 54-62, 2002. 
[41]  J.  Douceur,  “The  Sybil  attack”,  In 
Proceedings  of  the  1
st  International 
Workshop  on  Peer-to-Peer  Systems 
(IPTPS’02), February 2002. 
[42]  C.  R.  Murthy  and  B.S.Manoj,  “Transport 
layer  and  security  protocols  for  ad  hoc 
wireless  networks,”  in  Ad  Hoc  Wireless 
Networks  -  Architectures  and  Protocols, 
2004. 
[43]  D. Ganesan, R. Govindan, S. Shenker, and D. 
Estrin,  “Highly-resilient,  energy-efficient 
multipath  routing  in  wireless  sensor 
networks,”  SIGMOBILE  Mob.  Comput. 
Commun.  Rev.,  vol.  5,  no.  4,  pp.  11–25, 
2001. 
[44]  W.  Lou,  W.  Liu,  and  Y.  Fang,  “Spread: 
Enhancing data confidentiality in mobile ad 
hoc networks,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2004. 
[45]  P.  Papadimitratos  and  Z.  J.  Haas,  “Secure 
data  transmission  in  mobile  ad  hoc 
networks,” in WiSe ’03: Proceedings of the 
2003  ACM  workshop  on  Wireless  security. Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 10( Part -1), October 2014, pp.04-15 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                14 | P a g e  
New York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2003, pp. 
41–50. 
[46]  Y. Hu,  A. Perrig, and D. Johnson,  “Packet 
leashes: A defense against wormhole attacks 
in wireless ad hoc networks,” 2001. [Online]. 
Available: 
citeseer.ist.psu.edu/hu01packet.html. 
[47]  S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, 
“Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad 
hoc  networks,”  in  MobiCom  ’00: 
Proceedings of the 6th annual international 
conference  on  Mobile  computing  and 
networking. ACMPress, 2000, pp. 255–265. 
[48]  Y.  Zhang,  W.  Lee,  and  Y.-A.  Huang, 
“Intrusion  detection  techniques  for  mobile 
wireless networks,” Wirel. Netw., vol. 9, no. 
5, pp. 545–556, 2003. 
[49]  Y. Zhang and W. Lee, “Intrusion detection in 
wireless ad-hoc networks,” in MobiCom ’00: 
Proceedings of the 6th annual international 
conference  on  Mobile  computing  and 
networking.  New  York,  NY,  USA: 
ACMPress, 2000, pp. 275–283. 
[50]  P.  Michiardi  and  R.  Molva,  “Core:  a 
collaborative  reputation  mechanism  to 
enforce  node  cooperation  in  mobile  ad  hoc 
networks,”  in  Proceedings  of  the  IFIP 
TC6/TC11  Sixth  Joint  Working  Conference 
on  Communications  and  Multimedia 
Security.  Deventer,  The  Netherlands,  The 
Netherlands:  Kluwer,  B.V.,  2002, pp.  107–
121. 
[51]  F.  K.  Andreas,  “Sensors  for  detection  of 
misbehaving  nodes  in  manets.”  [Online]. 
Available: 
http://medien.informatik.uniulm.de/forschun
g/  publikationen / dimva2004.pdf 
[52]  W.Wang and B. Bhargava, “Visualization of 
wormholes in sensor networks,” in WiSe ’04: 
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on 
Wireless security. ACM Press, 2004, pp. 51–
60. 
[53]  H.  Hsieh  and  R.  Sivakumar,  “Transport 
OverWireless  Networks,”  Handbook  of 
Wireless  Networks  and  Mobile  Computing, 
Edited by Ivan Stojmenovic. John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 2002. 
[54]  C. Kaufman, R. Perlman, and M. Speciner, 
“Network Security Private Communication in 
a  Public  World,”  Prentice  Hall  PTR,  A 
division of Pearson Education, Inc., 2002. 
[55]  B. Wu, J. Chen, J. Wu, M. Cardei, “A Survey 
of  Attacks  and  Countermeasures  in  Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks,” Department of Computer 
Science  and  Engineering,  Florida  Atlantic 
University,  http://  student.fau.edu/  jchen8/ 
web /papers/ SurveyBookchapter.pdf 
 
[56]  A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen, 
and D. E. Culler, “Spins: security protocols 
for  sensor  networks,”  Wirel.  Netw.,  vol.  8, 
no. 5, pp. 521–534, 2002. 
[57]  J.  Elson  and  D.  Estrin,  “Time 
synchronization  for  wireless  sensor 
networks,” in IPDPS ’01: Proceedings of the 
15th  International  Parallel  &  Distributed 
Processing  Symposium.  Washington,  DC, 
USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2001, p. 186. 
[58]  M. Ding, D. Chen, K. Xing, and X. Cheng, 
“Localized  fault-tolerant  event  boundary 
detection  in  sensor  networks,”  in 
Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, Miami, FL, 
March 2005. 
[59]  T.  Palpanas,  D.  Papadopoulos,  V. 
Kalogeraki, and D. Gunopulos, “Distributed 
deviation  detection  in  sensor  networks,” 
SIGMOD  Rec.,  vol.  32,  no.  4,  pp.  77–82, 
2003. 
[60]  J.  Staddon,  D.  Balfanz,  and  G.  Durfee, 
“Efficient  tracing  of  failed  nodes  in  sensor 
networks,” in WSNA ’02: Proceedings of the 
1st ACM international workshop on Wireless 
sensor  networks  and  applications.  New 
York, NY, USA: ACM Press, 2002, pp. 122–
130 
 
 
             
Rajkumar is native of Bidar, 
Karnataka, India. He received 
his B.E  Degree in Computer 
Science  and  Engineering 
from VEC, Bellary, Gulbarga 
University  Gulbarga  and 
M.Tech  in  Computer 
Engineering  from  SJCE 
Mysore,  Visvesvaraya 
Technological  University  Belgaum.  and  he  is 
currently  pursuing his  Ph.D in Computer Science 
and Engineering  from Visvesvaraya Technological 
University  Belgaum,  Karnataka.  Presently  he  is 
serving as Assistant Professor in the department of 
Information Science and Engineering at Sambhram 
Institute  Of  Technology,  Bangalore.  His  areas  of 
interest  are  wireless  sensor  network,  data  analysis 
and security. (pyage2005@gmail.com) 
 
 Vani  B.  A  is  native  of 
Davangere, Karnataka, India. 
She received her B.E Degree 
in  Computer  Science  and 
Engineering  from  Bapuji 
Institute  of  Technology 
Davangere,  Kuvempu 
University  and  M.Tech 
Degree in Computer Science Rajkumar  et al. Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 10( Part -1), October 2014, pp.04-15 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                15 | P a g e  
& Engineering from Bapuji Institute of Technology 
Davangere, Visveswaraiah Technological University 
Belgaum.  Presently  she  is  serving  as  Assistant 
Professor in the department of Information Science 
and  Engineering  at  Sambhram  Institute  Of 
Technology,  Bangalore.  Her  areas  of  interest  are 
wireless  communication,  sensor  networks. 
(vanignanamogh@yahoo.com) 
 
 
G. Rajaraman is native of 
ramanathapuram,  Tamil 
Nadu,  India.  He  received 
his  B.E    Degree  in 
Computer  Engineering 
from RVS College of Engg 
&  Technology,  Dindugul, 
Madurai  Kamaraj 
University,  Madurai  and  M.Tech  in  Computer 
Science  & Engineering  from  SASTRA University, 
Thanjavur.  Presently  he  is  serving  as  Associate 
Professor in the department of Information Science 
and  Engineering  at  Sambhram  Institute  Of 
Technology,  Bangalore.  His  areas  of  interest  are 
wireless  sensor  network,  system  software  and 
compiler design. (chandra1994@yahoo.co.in) 
 
 
 
 
Dr. H. G. Chandrakanth is 
native  of  Bangalore, 
Karnataka,  India.  He 
received  B.E  Degree  from 
UVCE,  Bangalore 
University, Bangalore, India 
in  1991,  MSEE  from 
Southern  Illinois  University 
Carbondale, USA in 1994 and PhD from Southern 
Illinois  University  Carbondale,  USA  in  1998. 
Presently  he  is  working  as  Principal  in  Sambhram 
Institute  of  Technology,  Bangalore.   
(ckgowda@hotmail.com)           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  